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The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction:
Are the Convention's Goals Being Achieved?
JULIA A. TODD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Increases in divorce rates and international travel in recent years have
contributed to the growing problem of international child abduction.' The
primary international abductors of children are either noncustodial or joint
custodial parents who attempt to gain a full-time relationship with their child
by removing the child from the country without the knowledge of the other
parent. Often referred to as "child-snatching," this self-help method of
obtaining full-time custody is dangerous for the child and frustrates the usual
judicial process for determining custody.3
The parent whose child has been abducted endures financial and
emotional hardships while searching for an abducted child, and may be
forced to litigate in a foreign country for the return of the child or for the
enforcement of an existing custody decree. More importantly, international
child abduction causes psychological hardship to children, who are taken
from their customary environment and subjected to a new parental situation,
a new culture, and perhaps a new language.4
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington; B.A., 1991, Indiana
University, Bloomington.
1. See Brenda J. Shirman, International Treatment of Child Abduction and the 1980 Hague
Convention, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 188 (1991).
2. See discussion of a "wrongful" taking and the definition of wrongfulness under the
Convention, infra pp. 5-6. An abductor may possess custody rights, for example, in a joint custody
arrangement, and thus be entitled to take the child out of the country of habitual residence. However,
the taking is wrongful when the abduction deprives the other lawful custodian of his or her rights to
custody.
3. See, e.g., Monica Copertino, Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction: An Analysis of its Efficacy, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 715 (1991) (quoting M. AGOPIAN,
PARENTAL CHILD-STEALING 1 (1981)).
4. See id. "Children who are deprived of normal parental relationships can develop 'later
antisocial behavior [problems], such as delinquency, prostitution, and drug addiction' as well as
'mistrust, low self-esteem, and chronic depression."' Id. at I (quoting S. ABRAHMS, CHILDREN IN THE
CROSSFIRE 76 (1983)).
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction' (the Convention) is an international attempt to hasten the return
of children wrongfully abducted and to deter such abductions in the future.
The Convention was given force of law in the United Kingdom by the Child
Abduction and Custody Act, 1985. In the United States, the Convention
was implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act
(ICARA).' The Convention's stated goals are relatively simple: "to secure
the prompt return of children wrongfully removed or retained in any
Contracting State, and to ensure that the rights of custody and access under
the laws of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other
Contracting States."7  The Convention seeks to obtain these goals by
reestablishing the status quo and returning the child to his or her country of
habitual residence, where the merits of the custody dispute can be
determined.
Under the Convention, an international analysis of the "merits of any
custody issue" is specifically precluded The courts in the country to
which the child has been abducted, the "Requested State" under the
Convention, are responsible only for deciding whether immediate return is
warranted. The underlying custody issues are properly determined only in
the State of habitual residence: "the Hague Convention is clearly designed
to insure that the custody struggle must be carried out, in the first instance,
under the laws of the country of habitual residence . . . ."' By leaving the
ultimate custody determination to the courts in the country of habitual
residence, the Convention assures that an abducting parent cannot benefit
from his or her unilateral actions by obtaining a favorable custody order in
the Requested State.'" In recommending the Convention to the U.S. Senate
for ratification, President Ronald Reagan described its goals as follows:
5. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (hereinafter Hague Convention].
6. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-10 (1988).
7. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
8. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 19.
9. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1403 (6th Cir. 1993).
10. See Department of State Notices, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494-10,516 (1986). The Convention "is
not concerned with establishing the person to whom custody of the child will belong at some point in
the future .... It seeks, more simply, to prevent a later decision on the matter being influenced by a
change of circumstances brought about through unilateral action by one of the parties." (citing
Explanatory Report by Official Convention Reporter Professor Elisa Perez-Vera, Acts and Documents
of the Fourteenth Session Book III (1980)). Id. at 10,494.
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The Convention is designed promptly to restore the factual situation
that existed prior to a child's removal or retention. It does not seek
to settle disputes about legal custody rights, nor does it depend upon
the existence of court orders as a condition for returning children.
The international abductor is denied legal advantage from the
abduction . . . as resort to the Convention is to affect [sic] the
child's swift return to his or her circumstances before the abduction
... . In most cases this will mean return to the country of the
child's habitual residence where any dispute about custody rights
can be heard and settled."
Despite the Convention's simple and admirable goals, it remains true
that nations often have paternalistic views of family and childrearing. To
order the return of a child to a foreign nation, especially when the abductor
is a fellow citizen, undoubtedly proves difficult for judges in individual
cases. For this reason, an analysis of the limitations and exceptions in the
Convention that allow a court to refuse to order the prompt return of the
child becomes important. This Note will analyze the cases and commentary
in the United Kingdom and the United States to determine whether the
Convention's objectives are being undermined through the use of such
limitations and exceptions.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONVENTION
The Convention provides a simplified procedure for aggrieved parents
to employ in facilitating the return of the child to legal custody. The
Convention applies only between those countries that have ratified it, so-
called "Contracting States." The usual formalities of filing lawsuits in
foreign jurisdictions are minimized because the parent can use his or her
own governmental structure to seek the child's return.'2 Each Contracting
State must set up a "Central Authority" to serve as a liaison with the other
Contracting States.' 3 A parent whose child has been wrongfully removed
I1. Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan (Oct. 30, 1985), 51 Fed. Reg. 10,495
(1986).
12. H. Wayne Elliott, Beyond Reach? International Abduction Remedies, S.C. LAW., Sept.-Oct.
1992, at 18.
13. The Central Authority for the United States is the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the
Department of State. 22 C.F.R. § 94.2. For the United Kingdom, the Central Authority for England and
Wales was the Child Abduction Unit within the Lord Chancellor's Department. The England and Wales
Central Authority has now been relocated to the official Solicitor's Department. Carol S. Bruch, The
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can file an application with either the Central Authority of the home country
or the country where the child is located. Upon application, the Central
Authority must take all appropriate measures to discover the whereabouts of
the child, prevent harm to the child, protect the interests of the lawful
custodian or applicant, and secure the voluntary return of the child. If
necessary, the Central Authority can initiate judicial or administrative
proceedings to secure the child's return. 4
If a judicial proceeding is initiated, the court must act expeditiously.
Article 11 gives the applicant or the Central Authority of the Requested
State the right to demand a statement from the court detailing the reasons
for delay if a decision has not been made within six weeks from the
commencement of proceedings. 5 Swift resolution of these proceedings is
essential to the Convention's goal of returning abducted children to the
factual status quo as soon as possible. 6
There need not be a custody decree in effect in order to trigger the
return provisions under the Convention. A child can be ordered returned to
the person with whom the child was an habitual resident, even if the
abduction was not in violation of an existing custody order.'7 Children are
often abducted long before custody actions are initiated, and this provision
allowing parents to bring pre-decree petitions assures that children will not
be prejudiced by the legal inaction of their physical custodians, who may
not have anticipated the abduction.'8 In addition, because application of
Central Authority's Role Under the Hague Child Abduction Convention: A Friend In Deed, 28 FAM.
L.Q. 35, 43 n.34 (1994). For Scotland and Northern Ireland, the Authority is the Scottish Courts
Administration and the Northern Ireland Court Service respectively. Sarah Evans, International Child
Abduction, 142 NEw L.J. 232 (1992).
14. Elliott, supra note 12, at 2. See also Bruch, supra note 13, concluding that the Central
Authorities are the unsung heroes who facilitate the Convention's success. They can be helpful to
parents even before a problem occurs by suggesting preventative measures. They provide education to
the bench, the bar, and the public about the Convention. They guide a parent through the entire return
request, often providing help with translation and obtaining legal counsel, and much more. Id.
15. Department of State Notices, supra note 10, at 10,508.
16. Navarro v. Bullock, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1576 (1989), highlights the potential for quick
and effective relief under the Convention. The court ruled on the wrongfulness of the mother's retention
of her children only eight days after the father filed his petition.
17. In this way, the Convention is different from other U.S. laws that deal with child abduction.
Both the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 9 U.L.A. 116 (1979), and the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (1980), provide for enforcement
of existing custody decrees. Application of the UCCJA and the PKPA restores the legal status quo,
while application of the Hague Convention restores the factual status quo. Department of State Notices,
supra note 10, at 10,505.
18. Department of State Notices, supra note 10, at 10,505.
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the Convention is not contingent upon an existing custody order, there is no
need for interminable litigation concerning the enforcement of foreign
custody decrees, and the child can be returned more swiftly.' 9
Moreover, an abductor cannot insulate the child from the return
provisions by obtaining a custody order in the country of new residence.
Article 17 provides that the Requested State cannot refuse to return a child
solely on the basis of a court order awarding custody to the alleged
wrongdoer. However, article 17 does permit a court to consider the reasons
underlying an existing custody decree when it applies the Convention.2"
The primary duty of the courts in the Requested State is to determine
whether there has been a wrongful removal or retention. The child's
immediate return is mandated when a wrongful removal or retention is
found, unless one of the Convention's exceptions applies. Under ICARA,
the petitioner (the parent from whom the child has been taken) has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the removal was
wrongful.2' Under article 3, the removal or retention of a child is wrongful
where:
(a) it is in breach of custody rights attributed to a person, an
institution or another body, either jointly or alone, under the law of
the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately
before the removal or retention; and
(b) at the time of the removal or retention those rights were actually
exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised
but for the removal or retention.
The rights of custody mentioned in subparagraph (a) above, may
arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or
administrative decision, or by reason of agreement having legal
effect under the law of that state.22
The term "custody rights" as used in subparagraph (a) of article 3 is
defined in article 5(a) as "rights relating to the care of the person of the
child and, in particular, the right to determine the child's place of
19. Copertino, supra note 3, at 729.
20. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 17.
21. 42 U.S.C. § l1603(e)(l)(A) (1988).
22. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 3.
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residence. 23 The term takes on a more specific meaning by reference to
the law of the country in which the child was a habitual resident
immediately before the removal or retention. For example, in the United
States, prior to a decree of custody allocating rights between parents, both
parents are presumed to have a right of custody. If one parent unilaterally
interferes with the right of the other parent, the removal or retention is
wrongful.24 The final subparagraph of article 3 indicates that custody
rights may arise by operation of law, by reason of judicial or administrative
decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the laws
of that Contracting State.25 The aforementioned pre-decree right to custody
for each parent in the United States is an example of a custody right arising
by operation of law.
"Habitual Residence" is not defined by the Convention. The
determination of habitual residence is necessarily fact specific and, thus, the
term must remain fluid. If a country, such as the United States, has more
than one territorial unit, habitual residence refers to the particular unit where
the child was a resident. In the United States, this refers to the state where
the child lived.26
Subparagraph (b) of article 3 adds the requirement that the parent's
custody rights must be "actually exercised. '27  It is not difficult for an
applicant who seeks return of a child to demonstrate that his or her custody
rights were actually exercised. Preliminary evidence suggesting that the
parent took physical care of the child is sufficient.28 The question of
whether custody rights were "actually exercised" is most frequently an issue
under article 13, which provides an exception for return of the child if the
abductor can prove the nonexercise of custody rights. Therefore, under the
scheme of the Convention, it is presumed that a person who has custody
rights is actually exercising them.29
Article 21 deals with the obstruction of rights of visitation, termed
"access rights" by the Convention. Although ensuring rights of access is
one of the Convention's primary goals, the remedies for breach of access
23. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 5.
24. Shirman, supra note 1, at 206.
25. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 3.
26. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 3 1.
27. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 3.




rights do not include the return remedy.30 Moreover, the term "wrongful
retention" does not include the refusal by the custodial parent to permit
visitation by the other parent. Thus, a parent who is denied his or her rights
of access to the child by the custodial parent cannot request that the child
be ordered returned in order to commence visitation.3' The aggrieved
parent seeking access rights can apply to the Central Authority of any
Contracting State only for administrative assistance in acquiring access
rights.32
Indeed, in the United Kingdom, article 21 has been described as
toothless: "There are no teeth to be found in article 21 and its provisions
have no part to play in the decision to be made by the judge. '33  The
Court of Appeal in the case of Re G noted that article 21 did not confer
jurisdiction to the British courts to determine matters relating to access, or
to recognize or enforce foreign access orders. Instead, article 21 merely
provided for executive cooperation among Central Authorities in the
enforcement of such recognition as national law allows. 34 Accordingly, the
Court of Appeal held that the duty of the Lord Chancellor's Department,
Central Authority for England and Wales, was to make appropriate
arrangements for the applicant by providing solicitors to act on his or her
behalf in applying for legal aid and instituting proceedings under different
national laws.35
30. Id. at 10,513.
31. See Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241, 247 n. 10 (Mass. 1993). Under article 18, a judge has
discretion to order that children be returned for the purpose of visitation. However, the Convention
clearly distinguishes between mandatory return due to wrongful removal or retention and discretionary
return under article 18. Id.
32. See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 21. Article 21 instructs nations "to take steps to
remove, as far as possible, all obstacles to the exercise of [access] rights."
33. Re G (A Minor), I Fain. 669, 675 (Eng. C.A. 1993), available in LEXIS, Enggen Library,
CASES File.
34. Lord Chancellor's Department, Practice Note: Child Abduction Unit, I Fam. 804 (19911
35. Id.
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III. WAYS IN WHICH THE CONVENTION'S GOALS MAY BE UNDERMINED
A. The Lack of Contracting States
The most significant limitation to the Convention's effectiveness today
is the large number of nonsignatories to whom the Convention's provisions
do not apply.36 Thus, there are still many "Haven-States" where abductors
can take children and where the custodial parent will be forced to litigate a
custody determination in a foreign country, assuming the child can be
located.37 A parent will have no recourse under the Convention not only
when the child is abducted to a nonsignatory State, but also when the child
is an habitual resident of a nonsignatory State. For example, in Mohsen v.
Mohsen, the U.S. District Court for Wyoming refused to consider the
father's petition for return of his child to her habitual residence in Bahrain
because Bahrain is a nonsignatory to the Convention.38 The court's refusal
was based on the notion of reciprocity: "As a nonsignatory to the
Convention, Bahrain has no obligation to reciprocate by affording similar
rights to the respondent, in the event she found herself in a Bahrainian court
trying to secure the return of [the child] from that country. 39
Despite the concern for reciprocity in U.S. courts, courts in the United
Kingdom have consistently applied the principles of the Convention to order
the return of children to nonsignatory States:
The Court of Appeal has now ruled that the principles of the
Convention should be applied in non-Convention cases too. The
result is that, in the absence of any contra-indications which ...
would fall within the exceptions to the obligation to return, and in
the absence of other grounds for concern, such as the risk of
persecution or discrimination, or, doubtless, the application of non-
36. As of May 1, 1994, twenty-two countries were parties to the Convention. Bruch, supra note
13, at 36 n.2.
37. See Copertino, supra note 3; at 731-35.
38. Mohsen v. Mohsen, 715 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (D. Wyo. 1989). See also Mezo v. Elmergawi,
855 F. Supp. 59 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). A mother sued Secretary of State Warren Christopher, as head of the
Department of State, in an attempt to compel him to litigate under the Convention for the return of her
children. Despite the fact that her children were abducted first to Egypt and then to Libya, and that she
possessed valid custody orders in both the United States and Egypt, the State Department acting as
Central Authority was unable to help because neither Egypt nor Libya was a signatory to the Convention.
39. Mohsen, 715 F. Supp. at 1065.
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welfare principles by the foreign court, an abducted or wrongfully
retained child will normally be returned home, whether or not his
home is in a Contracting State.40
In Re S, the Court of Appeal, Civil Division, ordered the return of two
children to their father in Pakistan, a nonsignatory State. 41 The order was
made despite the mother's assertions that Pakistan does not apply a similar
system of law to govern the welfare of children, and that she would not get
a fair trial in any custody determination in Pakistan.42 On the issue of a
fair trial, the mother argued that fairness would be impossible due to the
influence of the father's family, a family of material substance. The court
accepted the trial judge's determination that the mother's assertion was
unsupported by the evidence.43 The Re S court then considered evidence
of the applicable law in Pakistan and found that the matter would be
governed by principles of Muslim law. According to Muslim law as applied
in Pakistan, the mother retains physical custody until the girl reaches
puberty and the boy reaches the age of seven. The mother loses entitlement
to bring up her children: (1) if she concludes a subsequent marriage, or
forms a liaison with another man other than a close relative to the children;
(2) if she is deemed to be unsuitable, for instance if she has a way of life
that the court considers un-Islamic; or (3) if there is a suggestion that the
children would not be raised as Muslims. 44
The court found that although Pakistani Muslim law is significantly
different from the law of England, the principles of Pakistani law would be
appropriate for these children, in light of the fact that both parents intended
to raise the children as Muslims. 4  The court suggested that summary
return can be justified even when the law of the habitual residence is
different from English law, so long as it is accepted by the English courts
as appropriate for the children.46
40. Ian Karsten, The Fight Against Child Abduction, 141 NEW L.J. 1290 (1991).
41. Re S (A Minor), 2 Fam. 499 (Eng. C.A. 1992), available in LEXIS, Enggen Library, CASES
File.
42. Id.; see also Re F, 140 NEw L.J. 1193 (1990) (holding that Convention principles applied
to resolution of the case, even though Israel was not a signatory at the time).
43. Re S (A Minor), 2 Fam. at 36.
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Although the United Kingdom's application of the Convention's
principles to nonsignatory States serves the key goal of immediately
returning wrongfully abducted children, no reciprocity is required from the
State of habitual residence. It is arguable, therefore, that nonsignatory States
will have no incentive to ratify the Convention, since their own children are
promptly returned by Contracting States. The United Kingdom's policy of
applying the Convention to nonsignatories compounds the problems caused
by a lack of Member States.
Why are there relatively few signatories to the Convention? First, since
there were only twenty-nine Member States to the Conference that wrote the
Convention,"7 it is doubtful that countries that did not participate in the
Convention's drafting would be eager to ratify. The legal systems of those
countries that are currently Contracting States are relatively homogeneous,
demonstrating that countries with divergent legal systems and social norms
are much less likely to become signatories. Those countries are also less
likely to have knowledge about the benefits of the Convention.48
Ultimately, the worldwide effectiveness of the Convention will depend
upon securing more Contracting States, thereby decreasing the number of
"Haven-States" for abductors.4
9
In addition to the problem of "Haven-States," there are several
limitations and exceptions inherent in the Convention's language that could
potentially hinder its goal of promptly returning abducted children. The
remainder of this discussion will focus first upon the Convention's
limitations, and second upon its exceptions, looking at case law applications
in these potentially damaging areas.
B. Limitations of Convention Applicability
A parent seeking return of an abducted child must overcome three major
limitations to the Convention's applicability. First, under article 35, the
47. Copertino, supra note 3, at 720.
48. See id. at 732.
49. There have been many suggestions for increasing the number of Contracting States, such as
using international human rights organizations to disseminate information about the Convention, creating
a United Nations expert committee to discover why countries are hesitant to become Contracting States,
and disseminating United Nations aid or subsidies to countries for the implementation of anti-abduction
programs. Id. at 10. In addition, it has been suggested that the United States should admonish non-
signatories by refusing to apply the UCCJA to these countries and by using economic incentives to
encourage ratification. Shirman, supra note 1, at 217.
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Convention applies only to removals or retentions that occurred after the
date when the Convention came into effect between the two countries.
Second, under article 4, the Convention does not apply once a child reaches
age sixteen. Third, under article 12, the court is not obligated to order the
return of a child when return proceedings are commenced one year or more
after the removal or retention, and it is proven that the child is settled in his
or her new environment.
Despite the strict nature of the exceptions in article 35 and article 4, it
is important to note that pursuant to article 36, a country can limit the
restrictions that might block a child's return."0 This can be accomplished
if two or more countries agree to extend the Convention to children beyond
sixteen years or to apply the Convention retroactively to removals and
retentions occurring before the Convention's entry into effect between the
two nations. Moreover, article 36 is supplemented in the Convention by
article 18, which notes that the Convention does not limit the power of
judicial authorities to order the return of a child pursuant to other existing
local laws or procedures, which may not include the age limitation in article
4.51
1. Article 35
Under a strict interpretation of article 35, the Convention will not apply
to a child who is wrongfully removed or retained in a Contracting State if
that removal or retention occurred before the Convention came into effect
between the two States. This provision has ongoing relevance, as new
countries continue to sign on as Contracting States. Although it is possible
to interpret article 35 liberally, covering removals or retentions that began
before the Convention took effect, but which continue after its entry into
force,52 this interpretation has been rejected by the United Kingdom's
courts. In the appeals of Re S and Re H, Canadian and U.S. mothers of
children wrongfully taken to England by their fathers argued that although
the removals had occurred before the Convention's effective date, the
removals were followed by retentions, and the children were still being
50. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 36.
51. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 18; Department of State Notices, supra note 10, at
10,504.
52. Department of State Notices, supra note 10, at 10,504.
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wrongfully retained after the Convention came into effect." The court
disagreed, holding that under the Convention, retention, like removal, is an
event occurring on a specific occasion. Removal occurs when a child is
unlawfully taken away from his or her state of habitual residence. Retention
occurs where a child.lawfully removed for a limited period is not returned
on the expiration of that period. Removal and retention are therefore
mutually exclusive concepts. According to the court, the children in these
cases were wrongfully removed, not retained, and that removal took place
before the Convention came into force.'
2. Article 4
Parents seeking the return of children over age sixteen have no remedy
at all under the Convention. Even if a child is under sixteen at the time of
the wrongful removal or retention, the Convention ceases to apply when the
child reaches sixteen." Brenda J. Shirman suggests an additional
provision in the Convention providing for the automatic return of mentally
or physically dependent children over the age of sixteen.56 Although the
arbitrary age limit of sixteen may seem unfair to parents of older children
who remain mentally or physically dependent, a provision providing for the
return of such children may prove to be burdensome for deciding courts.
A determination of mental or physical dependence would have to be made
by the court in the Requested State, possibly requiring evidence, such as the
testimony of psychologists or social workers, which is properly presented
only at the ultimate custody hearing in the State of habitual residence.
3. Article 12
The third limitation that petitioners must overcome under the
Convention is the one-year deadline for requesting a child's return. Under
53. Law Reporters to the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting, Re H and Re S, 88 L. Soc'y
GAZET-rE, July 17, 1991, at 34.
54. Id.; see also Re H (A Minor), 140 NEW L.J. 1192 (1990) (holding that wrongful retention
is not a continuing state of affairs but refers to the single act or event of wrongfully retaining the child
outside the jurisdiction).
55. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 4; Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Hague Draft
Convention on International Child Abduction, 14 FAM. L.Q. 99, 104 (1980). "It was assumed that
children above [age 16] could not ordinarily be abducted against their wishes." Id.
56. Shirman, supra note I, at 217.
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article 12, if it is demonstrated that the child is settled in his or her new
environment, a court is not obligated to return the child if the return
proceedings are commenced a year or more after the wrongful removal or
retention." The one-year statute of limitations was added to the
Convention because delegates felt that a failure to bring a swift application
may indicate acquiescence in, or mixed emotions about, the abduction."
Also, the delegates feared that ordering a return at such a late date might
cause additional confusion and psychological damage to the child.
The one-year statute of limitations has been criticized, however, because
an abductor could delay the commencement of the proceedings by
concealing the whereabouts of the child for more than a year.59 Clearly,
an abductor should not benefit from the use of article 12 when the
abductor's concealment of the child caused the delay. Courts must be
mindful of the reasons for delay when considering whether to order a child's
return, and the statute of limitations should begin to run only when the
petitioner has sufficient knowledge of the location of the child and the
abductor.' Moreover, there should be a strong burden on the abductor to
prove that the child is settled in his or her new environment. In the United
States, under ICARA, the alleged abductor has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of evidence that the child should not be returned because the
child is settled in the new environment.6
In David S. v. Zamira S., a U.S. court was faced with a mother's
argument under article 12 that her children had become settled in their new
environment.62 After finding that petitioner had met his burden of showing
by a preponderance of evidence that the children were wrongfully removed
from Ontario by their mother, the court considered whether the mother had
met her burden of showing by a preponderance of evidence that the children
should not be returned because they were settled in their new environment.
The court found that the mother had not met her burden and ordered the
return of the children.63
57. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 12.
58. Copertino, supra note 3, at 729.
59. See, e.g., id. at 730; Department of State Notices, supra note 10, at 10,509; Shirman, supra
note I, at 214-15.
60. Copertino, supra note 3, at 731.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B) (1988).
62. David S. v. Zamira S., 574 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1991).
63. Id. at 433.
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Although the mother wanted to remain in the new environment,
Brooklyn, New York, in order to be close to the "'population of available
Orthodox Jewish men' and search for a new husband," the court found no
significant ties indicating that the children, ages three years and one and
one-half years, were settled in the new environment.' On the contrary, the
court found that the children continued to have substantial and meaningful
connections to Ontario, the place of habitual residence and the home of their
father."
The court's decision on the article 12 question was clearly correct, as an
abducting parent cannot be permitted to prove that the children are settled
in their new environment by demonstrating the parent's own ties to the
community. However, it seems that ICARA's preponderance of evidence
standard could be too easily met in cases where the children are older and
have ties to a particular school or youth activity. A burden on the
respondent requiring clear and convincing evidence that the children are
settled in their new environment may better serve the Convention's goals
than ICARA's preponderance of evidence standard. ICARA requires
respondents to prove exceptions to a child's return under articles 13(b) or
20 by clear and convincing evidence. If the goals of deterring abduction
and acquiring the immediate return of abducted children are to be met, a
clear and convincing standard of proof should be required for an abducting
parent to block a child's return under article 12 as well.
C. Exceptions to the Return Requirement
In addition to the three limitations that a petitioning parent must
overcome in order to secure the return of a child under the Convention, four
important exceptions to the Convention's return requirement may be invoked
by the respondent. Three of those exceptions are contained in article 13; the
remaining exception is in article 20.66
64. Id.
65. Id.




Article 20 contains the Convention's public policy exception. It states,
"[t]he return of the child under the provisions of article 12 may be refused
if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the
Requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms."67  Article 20 is ambiguous and could be problematic should
courts choose to use the exception often. Those opposed to article 20 feared
that it could be interpreted broadly, possibly undermining the entire
Convention.6 8  However, the exception "was intended to be restrictively
interpreted and applied, and is not to be used, for example, as a vehicle for
litigating custody on the merits or for passing judgment on the political
system of the country from which the child was removed."69 There is no
evidence in the United Kingdom or the United States that article 20 has
been used by courts at all, much less as a frequent vehicle for refusing the
return of children. If countries with divergent political systems and
divergent notions of childrearing should eventually join as signatories to the
Convention, article 20 could be more frequently invoked. At this time,
however, the public policy exception in article 20 poses no viable threat to
the objectives of the Convention.
2. Article 13
In contrast to article 20, the exceptions contained in article 13 have been
frequently litigated. Under article 13(a), a court may deny an application for
the return of a child if the petitioner was not actually exercising custody
rights at the time of removal or retention, or if the petitioner had acquiesced
in the removal or retention.7" Article 13(b) allows a court, in its discretion,
to refuse the return of a child if there is "a grave risk of harm that return.
would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise
67. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 20.
68. Department of State Notices, supra note 10, at 10,510.
69. Id. Under ICARA, a respondent opposing the return of a child under article 20 has the
burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the article 20 exception applies. 42 U.S.C.
§ 11603(e)(2)(A) (1988).
70. Under ICARA, a respondent opposing the return of the child must prove this exception by
a preponderance of the evidence. 42 U.S.C. § II 603(e)(2)(B) (1988).
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place the child in an intolerable situation."' A third, unlettered paragraph
of Article 13 allows a court to refuse a child's return if the child objects to
being returned and the child has attained an age and degree of maturity at
which a court can appropriately consider the child's views.72
These exceptions were drawn narrowly by the Convention's drafters and
were intended to be interpreted narrowly by the courts.73 The ultimate
success of the Convention depends upon allowing the use of these
exceptions only in rare cases where a strict burden of proof has been met:
Nevertheless, the article 13 exceptions have been described as "so broad that
they are apt to turn what are to be summary proceedings into adversary
hearings on the merits, contrary to the purposes of the Convention."'74
Therefore, the true effect of the article 13 exceptions, as demonstrated by
their case law applications, deserves further analysis.
a. Article 13(a)
Two basic arguments can be raised by respondents under article 13(a).
First, respondents can argue that petitioner does not actually possess rights
of custody. Second, respondents can argue that petitioner acquiesced in the
child's removal or retention. In David S. v. Zamira S., the mother
(respondent) argued that the father (petitioner) did not possess custody rights
over their son, and thus was not entitled to the child's return under the
Convention.7" Whether a parent was exercising lawful custody rights at the
time of removal must be determined under the law of the child's habitual
residence.76 This means that a reviewing court faced with an Article 13(a)
argument must study the law of the country of habitual residence to
determine whether the petitioning parent actually possessed custody rights.
71. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 13(b). A respondent opposing the return of a child
under 13(b) in the United States must establish the exception by clear and convincing evidence. 42
U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A).
72. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 13. This exception must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence under ICARA. 42 U.S.C. § 1I603(e)(2)(B).
73. Department of State Notices, supra note 10, at 10,509.
74. Copertino, supra note 3, at 741 (quoting Bodenheimer, The Hague Draft Convention on
International Child Abduction, 14 FAM. L.Q. 99, 110 (1980)).
75. David S. v. Zamira S., 574 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1991).
76. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1402 (6th Cir. 1993). Because the Friedrich court
found Germany to be the child's habitual residence, the case was remanded for determination of whether,
under German law, the child's father was exercising custody rights at the time of removal.
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David S. v. Zamira S. involved two children, a son and a daughter, whose
habitual residence was Ontario, Canada." There had been no valid
separation agreement or custody decree concerning the daughter and, thus,
under Ontario law, the petitioner and respondent had equal rights to custody
of their daughter.78 With respect to their son, however, the father's
statutory right to custody had been suspended by virtue of a separation
agreement that only granted the father access rights to the son. The court
noted that the mother's arguments under 13(a) were meritorious with regards
to the son because the father had only access rights and not rights of
custody.79 Nevertheless, the court ordered both of the children returned to
their father.8"
The separation agreement limited the mother's ability to relocate the
children outside of the Metropolitan Toronto area.8 However, the mother
relocated the children to the United States and, in response to this
contemptuous conduct, the Supreme Court of Ontario subsequently gave
temporary custody of both children to the father. Therefore, even though
the father did not possess traditional rights of custody over the son at the
time of removal, the court interpreted the father's ability to force the mother
to remain in Toronto with the children as a type of custody right.82
Although this interpretation seemingly pushes the limit of what constitutes
a right of custody, it is consistent with the article 5(a) definition of custody
rights as "the right to determine the child's place of residence. 8 3
The United Kingdom Court of Appeal exhibited a narrower view of
custody rights in its interpretation of the applicable law in Australia, the
country of habitual residence in Re J." The father in this case petitioned
for return of his child to Australia pursuant to the Convention after the
mother left for the United Kingdom with the child.85 The parents were
unmarried, however, and Australian law gave the custody and guardianship
77. David S. v. Zamira S., 574 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1991).
78. Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O., ch. 68, § 20(1) (1990) (Can.). This section provides
that "the father and mother of a child are equally entitled to custody of the child."




83. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 5(a).
84. Law Reporters to the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting, Re J (A Minor), 87 L. Soc'y
GAzETTE, Oct. 3, 1990, at 39.
85. Id.
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of a child of unmarried parents solely to the mother, unless a court ordered
otherwise. The father obtained a court order granting him custody of the
child, but only after the mother's removal of the child. The court indicated
that retention could only be wrongful and in breach of the father's custody
rights if the father possessed custody rights immediately before the retention.
Since the removal occurred before the father obtained a custody order
granting him rights to the child, the removal was not in breach of these
rights.86
These two cases, David S. v. Zamira S. and Re J, demonstrate the
disparate results that might be reached based on a Requesting State's judicial
reading of the custody laws in the State of habitual residence. Although
neither of these cases was improperly decided, they highlight the possibility
that a court's bias against a petitioner, or the petitioner's country of habitual
residence, could be exercised through an uninformed reading of the custody
law in the State of habitual residence.
A parent can also argue under article 13(a) that the petitioning parent
acquiesced to the removal or retention. This argument is difficult to make,
however, since an application for return indicates that the petitioner does not
want the child living in a foreign country.87 Perhaps the strongest
argument for acquiescence is when the petitioner has allowed the one-year
statute of limitations to run. However, the abducting parent's unilateral
actions must not have precipitated the delay, and the child's return will still




The article 13(b) "grave risk of harm" exception, like the other article
13 exceptions, was intended to be construed narrowly and applied only in
rare circumstances.8 9  Nevertheless, article 13(b) is the most frequently
litigated exception, because it comes the closest to allowing the Requested
86. For another case narrowly interpreting parental rights in a country of habitual residence, see
Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241 (1993) (holding that the father's rights under Hungarian Law amounted
to rights of access and not rights of custody).
87. See Becker v. Becker, 15 Fain. L. Rep. 1605 (BNA) (1989) (finding that although the mother
may have acquiesced in the removal of her children, she did not consent to their retention).
88. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 13.
89. See Department of State Notices, supra note 10, at 11,509.
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State's court to examine the merits of the case. 90 Because litigation of the
underlying custody dispute, including the "best interests" of the child, is
prohibited by the Convention at the hearing seeking return of the child,
litigants often surreptitiously attempt to bring in evidence of this nature by
using article 13(b). Yet, "[t]he Convention's drafters ... did not intend for
this exception to be used by defendants as a vehicle to allow the litigation
or relitigation of the abducted child's 'best interests."' 91
Article 13(b) is also dangerous because the terms "grave risk of harm"
and "intolerable situation" are susceptible to various interpretations, and
because abductors can use the exception as machinery for delay.92
Caroline LeGette advocates a strict construction of the term "intolerable
situation":
Return of the child to a home where financial resources and
educational opportunities are more limited than that offered by the
abducting parent would not place the child in an 'intolerable
situation' within the meaning of article 13(b). Instead, only those
situations in which the child would be threatened with sexual or
physical abuse should be considered intolerable.93
Although article 13(b) does not permit refusing an order of return merely
because financial or educational opportunities in the habitual residence are
more limited, LeGette's definition disregards article 13(b)'s inclusion of
"psychological harm," focusing instead on physical harms.
Parents seeking to block a child's return frequently argue that
psychological harm will ensue because of the return and, almost universally,
such claims of psychological harm are properly rejected by the courts.
However, Legette's definition reads the term "psychological harm" out of
90. Caroline LeGette, International Child Abduction and the Hague Convention: Emerging
Practice and Interpretation of the Discretionary Exception, 25 TEX INT'L L.J. 287, 297 (1990).
91. Id.; see also Tahan v. Duquette, 613 A.2d 486, 489 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1992).
[T]he Article 13(b) inquiry was not intended to deal with issues or factual questions which
are appropriate for consideration in a plenary custody proceeding. Psychological profiles,
detailed evaluations of parental fitness, evidence concerning lifestyle and the nature and
quality of relationships all bear upon the ultimate issue. The Convention reserves these
considerations to the appropriate tribunal in the place of habitual residence ....
Id.
92. Re E (A Minor), 1 Fano. 135, 25 (Eng. C.A. 1988), available in LEXIS, Enggen Library,
CASES File.
93. LeGette, supra note 90, at 297-98.
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13(b), rendering helpless a parent whose child will legitimately be subject
to severe emotional abuse upon return. An "intolerable situation" should
include a situation where a child might endure severe psychological harm.
Nevertheless, claims of psychological harm must be viewed skeptically
by the courts, as they have been in recent years in the United States and the
United Kingdom. For example, in the United Kingdom case of Re C, the
mother (respondent) argued that the removal of the child would cause grave
psychological harm, because the child would be separated from her.94 The
Court of Appeal held that the article 13(b) exception does not apply when
the risk would occur only if the mother refused to accompany the child back
to the country of habitual residence.95 Although the mother in Re C had
legitimate reasons for not wanting to return to the habitual residence, the
court declined to hold that the mother's refusal to return would cause a
grave risk of harm to the child. Lord Justice Butler-Sloss would not extend
the 13(b) exception to such situations, noting that to do so would "drive a
coach and four through the Convention."'96
Re C is an excellent decision and a proper example. The court did not
allow a parent to profit from the abduction by refusing to return with the
child and then claiming that the child would suffer psychological harm from
the separation.
Is a parent to create the psychological situation, and then rely upon
it? If the grave risk of psychological harm to a child is to be
inflicted by the conduct of the parent who abducted him, then it
would be relied upon by every mother of a young child who
removed him out of the jurisdiction and refused to return. 97
Another noteworthy aspect of the Re C decision is that the father in
Australia was required to make certain "undertakings" regarding the
financial position of the mother, should the mother and child return to
Australia.98 Similarly, in Re L, the father seeking return of his child to the
94. Re C (A Minor), 139 NEw L.J. 226 (1988); see also Re L (A Minor), 2 Fam. 401 (1993),
available in LEXIS, Enggen Library, CASES File (holding that a mother could not claim grave
psychological harm due to separation because she feared that her visa would be denied and she would
not be permitted to return).






United States made undertakings, offering to allow the mother to stay in the
matrimonial home and to pay the air fares for the return of mother and
child." The offers of accommodation made by the fathers in those two
cases certainly made the court's refusal to apply article 13(b) easier. It is
unclear whether these decisions would have been made in the same way if
the court had been certain that the mother would endure hardship if forced
to return with the child. If the spirit of the Convention is to be maintained,
and abductors deterred, parents must be consistently barred from arguing
that psychological harm will result from their own refusal to return to the
country of habitual residence. The abducting parent and the child must
return to the habitual residence, where the issue of hardship can be raised
in the custody dispute on the merits of the case.
c. The Child's Opinion
The third and final exception contained in the last unlettered paragraph
of article 13 allows a court to deny a return petition if a child of sufficient
age and maturity objects to the return. This exception gives significant
discretion to the court to determine what age and level of maturity is
required to make a decision of this sort."° This provision is potentially
problematic because an abducting parent could exert undue influence over
the child. However, consideration of the child's preference is not
mandatory, and courts can attach little weight to the child's opinion if
brainwashing by the abducting parent is suspected. As with the other
exceptions, the last article 13 exception has caused no real damage to the
Convention's goals as applied by courts in the United States and the United
Kingdom.
D. Determining Habitual Residence
The final area where the Convention's objectives might be undermined
is the determination of habitual residence. Ultimately, the success of a
petition for return is contingent upon the court agreeing that petitioner's
99. Re L (A Minor), 2 Farn. 401, 12 (1993).
100. See Sheikh v. Cahill, 546 N.Y.S.2d 517, 521-22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); Tahan v. Duquette,
613 A.2d 486, 490 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1992). Both cases held that a child of nine was not mature enough
to voice an objection to the return.
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home country is the habitual residence. This determination is often
extremely difficult because children in international marriages in which
divorces have occurred are moved around the world quite frequently.
Courts faced with a genuine question concerning a child's habitual residence
must make a fact-specific inquiry in each case.
In the United States, the leading case concerning habitual residence is
Friedrich v. Friedrich.°" In Friedrich, the Sixth Circuit noted that a
child's habitual residence cannot be easily altered. "A child's habitual
residence can be altered only by a change in geography and the passage of
time, not by changes in parental affection and responsibility." 2
Furthermore, the change in geography must occur before the questionable
removal, and must not be a result of the removal." 3 A court determining
the habitual residence of a particular child must focus on the child, and not
the parents, and must examine past experience, not future intentions."
The Friedrich court found that the mother's removal of the child from
Germany to the United States precipitated the change in geography, noting
that "[ilf we were to determine that by removing Thomas from his habitual
residence without Mr. Friedrich's knowledge or consent Mrs. Friedrich
'altered' Thomas's habitual residence, we would render the Convention
meaningless."'0 5  The respondent mother, a member of the U.S. armed
services stationed in Germany, argued that it was always her intention for
Thomas to reside in the United States. However, the court refused to
consider the mother's future intentions, stating that they were irrelevant to
the inquiry.1' 6
However, in both the United States and the United Kingdom, other cases
have considered the intentions of the parent when determining habitual
residence. In the United Kingdom case of Re J, the Court of Appeal held
that the habitual residence of an infant who is in the sole custody of his
mother is necessarily the same as hers. 7 Therefore, since the mother in
this caseleft Australia with the settled intention never to return, the child
101. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993).
102. Id. at 1402.
103. Id.; see also Slagenweit v. Slagenweit, 841 F. Supp. 264 (N.D. Iowa 1993).
104. Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401.
105. Id. at 1402.
106. Id.
107. Law Reporters to the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting, Re J (A Minor), 87 L. Soc'y
GAZETTE, Oct. 3, 1990, at 39.
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ceased to be a habitual resident of Australia. Although the Re J court's
consideration of the mother's intention seems to contradict the ruling in
Friedrich, the two cases are distinguishable. The mother in Re J had sole
custody, the father possessing no custody rights, while in Friedrich the
father had valid custody rights.' Therefore, the intentions of the sole
custodian of a very young child may be relevant to the habitual residence
inquiry, but one parent's intentions should not be considered when both
parents enjoy custody rights.
Ponath v. Ponath raises an additional consideration for courts who are
determining habitual residence. 9  The Ponath court stated that
"[a]lthough it is the habitual residence of the child that must be determined,
the desires and actions of the parents cannot be ignored by the court in
making that determination when the child was at the time of removal or
retention an infant.""'  The court also noted that "[t]he concept of habitual
residence must . . . entail some element of voluntariness and purposeful
design.""'
In Ponath, the court found the child's habitual residence to be the
United States, despite the fact that the family's move to Germany might
have been viewed as a change of habitual residence. The court considered
the move to Germany to be an extended visit, rather than a change of
residence, because the mother wanted to return to the United States with the
child yet was willfully obstructed from doing so by the father's verbal,
emotional, and physical abuse. "In the court's view, coerced residence is
not habitual residence.""' 2 The Ponath court's consideration of the
mother's intentions can be distinguished from the refusal to consider the
mother's intentions in Friedrich, because the mother in Ponath was coerced
into residing with the child in Germany.
The Friedrich case has been described as an example of the "American
judicial commitment to uniformity and international comity" in the
interpretation of the Convention."' Friedrich requires both a change in
108. The Friedrich court remanded for determination of whether the father was exercising custody
rights under German Law. Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1402.
109. Ponath v. Ponath, 829 F. Supp. 363 (D. Utah 1993).
110. Id. at 367.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 368; see also Prevot v. Prevot, 855 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Tenn. 1994) (refusing to apply
the Ponath coerced residence argument to the factual situation at issue.)
113. Mark Dorosin, Note, You Must Go Home Again: Friedrich v. Friedrich, The Hague
Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 743,
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geography and a passage of time in order to alter habitual residence. This
strict requirement represents an important adherence to the policy goals of
the Convention."' The Friedrich case and the recent case law in both the
United States and the United Kingdom demonstrate that courts in these two
nations have refused to use the determination of habitual residence as a
means of denying the return of children under the Convention.
IV. CONCLUSION
A detailed review of the cases and commentary in the United States and
the United Kingdom reveals that courts in both countries are adhering to the
spirit of the Convention by refusing to liberally construe its limitations and
exceptions, and by determining the country of habitual residence in a
uniform manner. Although ordering the return of a child to a foreign
country must undoubtedly be difficult for courts, strict adherence to the
Convention's goals and methods will insure that children abducted from the
United States and the United Kingdom will be returned home. Moreover,
judicial authorities in both countries are consistently demonstrating to
parents that an international abduction will no longer aid them in obtaining
a favorable custody decree. In decisions to date, the courts in the United
States and the United Kingdom have fostered and served the Convention's
most important goal-deterring international child abduction.
755 (1993).
114. Others have also recognized the importance of this requirement.
As one of the highest judicial holdings on these provisions, the precedential effects are far
reaching, and although this action frustrates the efforts of an American citizen, "it ultimately
ensures that prompt return of the American children abducted to foreign countries pursuant
to the broadest sense of reciprocity under the Convention."
Id. at 756 (quoting Dana R. Rivers, The Hague International Child Abduction Convention and The
International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 2 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 589, 590 (1989)).
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